Increased use of marketing contracts by agritomato purchase contracts are: (a) a specifically cultural firms has stimulated a modest amount of defined market price, (b) seller's variable production literature in which the principles of decision theory cost times a markup ("cost-plus") and (c) buyer's are applied to the contracting problem. Much of this revenue from resale times a markdown ("salesliterature has focused on farmers' choices between minus"). cash and futures market positions [7] . Others have Under market price contracts both buyer and modeled the influence of annual open market and seller may avoid opportunity losses; that is, short fixed forward price options on farm growth objecterm situations in which the open market offers more tives [1, 3] . Little or no attention has been paid to advantageous terms than does the contract. However, expressed interest, especially among processors, for if long-term contracting or vertical integration is suitable long-term (multi-annual) contract price widespread in an industry, market prices reflect such formulae and for a theoretical framework through a thin proportion of trade that little opportunity is which to evaluate them. This paper attempts to permitted for additional trade at those prices. provide this service in special regard to the tomato Besides, market prices are often highly volatile, a and tomato paste contracting problems of a U.S. fruit drawback for security conscious business firms. and vegetable processing cooperative.
Cost-plus prices are advantageous to sellers because they guarantee sellers a fixed or fixed rate of gross margin. Variable costs of farm production are ALTERNATIVE PRICING ARRANGEMENTS usually more stable than market prices of farm
The modeled cooperative processor has comoutput, so that cost-plus prices for farm products are mitted a specific tonnage of bulk tomato paste for more predictable than associated market prices. ten-year contract sale to a distributor who reprocesses Sales-minus prices constitute a seller's share of the paste into tomato sauce. In the model variation buyer's resale revenue; buyers are guaranteed a fixed considered here, 25 percent of anticipated raw or fixed rate of gross return over the sales-minus tomatoes needed to service the paste contract is priced input. Behavior of sales-minus prices depends expected to be purchased from non-member growers.
on prevailing market conditions for the resold good Non-member tomato purchase contracts are presently and buyer's sales strategies and aggressiveness relative signed by the acre on an annual basis, but the to that good. At present, little long term contracting cooperative wishes to consider ten-year contracts that is encountered in U.S. paste markets.The majority of would, apart from yield fluctuations, secure the paste is sold at spot market prices, but cost-plus integrity of the ten-year paste contract.' Alternative contracts are beginning to attract interest. Some raw price formulae designed for both paste sale and tomatoes are sold on three to five year market price 1Contract alternatives were not considered for member growers since it is assumed all members receive a share of cooperative net operating margin.
contracts, and processing cooperatives often purchase price formulae, (d) substitute these moments into the vegetables on sales-minus agreements called secondary mean and variance formulae and minimize net margin pools. Long term contracts employing variants of the variance at selected mean values. above formulae will likely expand in both paste and tomato markets in the future.
Net Margin Function The cooperative's net margin function, which MODEL CONSTRUCTION does not include a valuation of raw product delivered from member growers, is provided in Table 1 . Lines Portfolio Efficiency Criteria 1, 10 and 12 contain revenue and costs of nonWork by Markowitz [5] and others has demontomato-paste activities; lines 2-5, formulae defining strated that a portfolio of contract options possesses operation of market price, cost-plus and sales-minus greater advantages for risk averting firms than does prices as they apply to tomato paste contract sales; reliance on any single option, provided expected lines 6-8, formulae defining these prices as they apply returns of each option are sufficiently close. In the to nonmember tomato purchases; and lines 9 and 11, absence of quantitative measures of firm money other variable and fixed costs of contract tomato utility, research work is reduced to identifying paste operations. "efficient" portfolios. The most general method of A contract to trade a specified tonnage of goods isolating contract portfolios that would never be is expected to have a different impact on profit employed by a risk averse, expected utility maxivariability than a contract to trade random output of mizing firm is to compare cumulative distribution a specified number of acres. Both can be modeled in functions of earnings under each portfolio and reject fluctuate with tomato yields; these yields are usually utility within a specified range of wealth, considerarepresented by an average yield, which is a constant. tion of moments higher than the variance is unIf paste is sold by its equivalent raw product necessary and the more familiar E-V analysis 2 proacre-yield, sales receipts vary randomly both with per duces results identical to stochastic dominance tests ton price and with per acre tomato yields; in this case [4] . It was unnecessary to invoke the theoretically yields are represented by a random variable. It is troublesome quadratic utility since, as shown below, usual for raw tomatoes to be purchased on an the normality assumption was found acceptable in acre-yield basis. Where paste is sold on forward the present circumstance. E-V analysis was then contract per ton, the cooperative may contract the selected over stochastic dominance on the basis of its number of tomato acres required under expected substantially greater programming ease.
yields to produce this tonnage. Deviations from Paste and tomato contracting problems were expected yields are thus a source of cooperative net separately studied from the point of view of nonmargin variability. 4 member grower, cooperative and distributor/ Cooperative revenue in the sales-minus purchase reprocessor. In each case, alternative portfolios were option may include revenues from all processing evaluated by E-V analysis and by parametric expected activities or those from paste contract sales only. In utility maximizations [2] . Only E-V results and only either event, contracting growers' crop payments are the cooperative's case are reported here. To cast the affected by the contract portfolio the cooperative contracting problem in an E-V framework it was adopts for its paste sales. This presents modeling necessary to: (a) specify the cooperative's net margin problems. If, for example, in a sales-minus purchase function 3 including all pricing options, (b) develop contract the cooperative wishes to pay growers a mean and variance formulae for net margins, (c) estishare of its paste sale revenue earned under the mate means, variances and covariances of alternative optimal paste sale portfolio, lines 2-5 must be 2 E-V analysis refers to identification of that set of strategies which provide minimum variance of return for selected fixed expected returns. 3Cooperative and non-cooperative business firms often consider other objectives than net margin. However, such alternatives are not molded in the present study. remains positive but is remarkably flat. The corthis study, estimated from the firm's subjective responding coefficient of variation curve behaves probabilities assigned to alternative future trends.
similarly. Since additional net margin expectation is Distributions Et are estimated from historical values purchased with very low increments of risk, only about the historical trend, under the assumption that highly risk averse decision makers would avoid the variance around whatever future trend develops is at profit maximum strategy. This strategy calls for least approximated by variance around the historical market price paste sales and cost-plus tomato purtrend. From simulated values of Xt, mean and chases. Exceedingly risk averting coops would ignore variance are calculated for each year t and these the market price sales option and evenly divide sales summed to provide prediction probability moments between cost-plus and sales-minus; their purchases appropriate for a long-term decision. Prediction would mostly be made at market prices. covariances are estimated by combining prediction
In frontier set #2, the impact of a slightly higher standard deviations with correlation coefficients cost-plus sales markup m and lower sales-minus sales computed from historical series, where these series markdown n is dramatic. The range of net margin are adjusted to induce expected future trend.
choices increases 600 percent and both curves An advantage of the simulation model is that develop bowl shapes. Cost-plus replaces market price random values are generated from which chi-square as the high mean profit sales option. Interesting tests of alternative distribution forms can be changes are also noted in the tomato purchase designed. In the present case, it was assumed that portfolios, where market price increases its proportrend errors E t are normally distributed with zero tions in the mid-mean range at the expense of means. Subjective trend probabilities B were discrete cost-plus. Because no changes were made in purchase and did not conform to theoretical distributions; side parameters, this effect must be due to cosome were moderately asymmetric. However the variances between revenue and cost terms in the net hypothesis that resultant combined variables X t are margin function. Specifically, 65 percent of tomato normally distributed was rejected only in the instance paste production costs are accounted for by tomato of grower variable costs (VCFOm ). market price, so that sales side cost-plus option V 2 and purchase side market price option R 1 are related Efficient Portfolio Solution by a negative sign in the net margin function. Thus as The completely specified E-V model is not cost-plus sales increase in portfolio importance due to reported here due to the lengthy set of covariance a rise in the cost-plus markup, risk averters are data involved in the variance expression. Seven motivated to increase the proportion of market price cooperative E-V curves were estimated by a quadratic tomato purchases as well. Presence of covariances programming routine, each representing a different means that sales and purchase contract portfolios are set of assumptions regarding cost-plus markups m and interdependent. k and sales-minus markdowns n and 1 s : tonnage or Efficiency set #3 is included to demonstrate acreage basis paste sales; revenue bases for the what happens when a firm restricts its own access sales-minus tomato purchase contracts; optimism of to alternative price formulae. In this case, to guard price forecasts; and use restrictions on selected against market opportunity losses, market price contract formulae. Three of these curves are listed in paste sales may not fall below 60 percent of total Table 2 and graphed in Figures 1 through 3 . Solid contract sales. Since market price sales are the lines indicate efficient mean, variance tradeoffs and high risk option, this constraint removes the lower dotted lines indicate mean, coefficient of variation portion of the E-V curve. The remaining portion is tradeoffs. 6 Assumptions under which each set of steeply sloped. Moderately to strongly risk averse curves is constructed are given in Table 2 footnotes. utility indifference curves would become tangent Moments measured on axes represent ten-year sums at the risk minimizing corner solution but would of net margin.
be less steeply sloped than the E-V curve at this point. Hence, in this case the goal of avoiding SELECTED MODEL RESULTS market opportunity losses is inconsistent with the After an initial negatively sloped range that risk goal of maximizing expected utility of realized or averse decision-makers would ignore, E-V curve #1 accounting earnings. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS returns function. It is usual for portfolio studies to examine a set of business activities in isolation from One E-V analysis drawback is that decisionthe decision maker's total profit and loss picture. This makers have no way to select a portfolio they can be practice would involve significant inaccuracy in the sure will maximize expected utility. The best a firm present contracting problem since satisfaction from can do is apply a rule of thumb that is intuitively purchase and sales activities are not independent. meaningful and associated with acceptable past Furthermore, alternative contract possibilities should experiences. However, variances have low intuitive not be evaluated apart from noncontract revenue or value because they are expressed in different units variable costs since covariances between contract and than means and are generally extraordinarily large. A noncontract activities, and the level of noncontract more meaningful measurement is the coefficient of business itself, affect desirability of contract portvariation curve which reflects changes in relative risk folios. as net margin expectation increases. Useful rules of Further work should be devoted to structuring thumb might limit relative risk or its positive rate of methods whereby decision-makers can conveniently change. Selection rules relating to coefficients of combine historical information with prognostications variation may be entirely inconsistent with those of future conditions to arrive at reliable prediction relating to variances. In efficiency sets #1 and #2, for probability distributions. Historical probabilities example, portions of rising variance are associated alone are inadequate guides to decisions commiting with declining relative risk.
TABLE 2. E-V AND COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION FRONTIERS INDICATING EFFICIENT PORTFOLIOS OF MARKET PRICE, COST-PLUS AND SALES-MINUS CONTRACTS FOR COOPERATIVE TOMATO PASTE SALES AND RAW TOMATO PURCHASES
oneself to future uncertainties. E-V results not An important result of the E-V studies, for reported here were highly sensitive to changes in distributor and grower as well as cooperative, is that employed probability distributions. In contrast, apparently minor changes in contract formulae can Porter and Gaumnitz [6] have shown that E-V and have significant impact on the content of efficient stochastic dominance tests produce similar results in portfolios and their promised returns and risk. An all but the minimum variance region. Hence, emphasis efficiency curve analysis would therefore be a valuon probability formulation should have greater able guide to firms engaged in planning and negoimpact on accuracy of long-term decisions than use of tiating contract terms. Special care must be taken in theoretically more powerful but less programmable this regard to design a complete and accurate net stochastic dominance.
